



International Report 2H 2016



International report

We report the number of demands we received in the second half of 2016 from law enforcement for customer information in each country outside the U.S. in which we do business (and had such demands) that does not legally prohibit us from reporting such information. The table below presents the number of demands we received in the second half of 2016; following that number, in parenthesis, is the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands.

A few notes about the table. A customer selector is an information point, such as a telephone number or IP address, used to identify a customer. Our initial reports only included the number of customer selectors; since, we have also been presenting the number of demands we have received. To provide more detail, we have divided the number of demands in the chart below into two categories. A demand for subscriber information typically requires that we provide the name and address of a customer assigned a given phone number or IP address. A demand for transactional information may, for instance, seek a log of numbers called.

We also report the number of lawful demands for intercepts (and the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands) that we received in Germany, the only country, other than the United States, in which we received demands to intercept content and are not precluded from reporting.

Finally, as explained in the notes accompanying the table, there are some limits to what we can disclose regarding law enforcement demands.

Demands for customer data (Outside of the United States)

	1st Half of 2015		2nd Half of 2015		1st Half of 2016		2nd Half of 2016	
	Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)		Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)		Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)		Number of Demands (Number of Customer Selectors in those Demands)	
Country	For Subscribers Information	For Transactional Information	For Subscribers Information	For Transactional Information	For Subscribers Information	For Transactional Information	For Subscribers Information	For Transactional Information
Australia ¹	8(8)	1(1)	17(17)	1(1)	20(20)	0	3(3)	7(7)
Austria	1(1)	0	1(1)	0	2(2)	0	3(3)	0
Belgium	144(165)	4(4)	123(193)	0	168(233)	0	88(132)	1(1)
Canada	4(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	462(608)	0	462(543)	0	521(616)	0	542(641)	0
Germany ²	1(1)	181(300)	3(3)	251(347)	15(15)	422(426)	24(24)	418(418)
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0



	1st Half of 2015		2nd Half of 2015		1stHalf of 2016		2nd Half of 2016	
India ³								
Italy	9(9)	2(2)	0	0	0	9(9)	0	36(36)
Japan	5(5)	0	15(18)	0	0	0	7(7)	0
Netherlands ⁴	54(54)	11(11)	92(92)	28(28)	23(23)	10(10)	8(8)	19(19)
Singapore	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	3(3)	0	3(3)	0	8(8)	0	16(16)	0
Taiwan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	145(163)	4(4)	94(111)	7(9)	43(46)	10(16)	36(42)	5(7)

NOTES:

1. In Australia we are precluded by law from reporting the number of warrants we received from law enforcement for interceptions or stored communications. As such, for Australia, we provide only the numbers of demands for subscriber information and transactional information.
2. In Germany, in addition to legal demands for subscriber information and transactional information, we received demands for lawful intercepts. In the second half of 2016, we received 2,039 such demands regarding 2,039 customer selectors. All of these demands were for the interception of calls initiated in Germany and made to specified international numbers. We did not receive demands for interceptions from any other European country.
3. In India we are precluded by law from discussing any information about the requests we might receive from the Government of India or identifying the specific number of websites that we were asked to block by the Government of India.
4. In the Netherlands the Central Information Point for Telecommunications (CIOT in Dutch) program run by the Ministry of Justice requires telecommunications providers to store all subscriber data (name, address, service provided, name of provider, telephone numbers, IP-addresses, and email-addresses) in a central database that is accessible to Dutch law enforcement. The information we report here does not include access by Dutch law enforcement to customer data that are stored in the CIOT database. The Dutch government provides its own report on law enforcement access to the information stored by all providers in the CIOT database: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2016/02/03/ciot-jaarverslag-2015>.

No extraterritorial demands

Verizon provides cloud computing and data storage services to business customers around the world, including many non-U.S. customers in data centers outside the United States. In our prior reports, we advised that we had not received any demands from the United States government for data stored in other countries for the periods covered in those reports. Likewise, we did not receive any demands in the United States for data stored in other countries in the second half of 2016. Nor do we anticipate that we will receive such a demand going forward. Indeed, on June 14, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed our long-held view that the U.S. government cannot use a warrant to obtain communications stored by our non-U.S. customers in our data centers outside the United States. Verizon had filed briefs in the case because it is important that our customers outside the United States have confidence that the U.S. government cannot compel Verizon to turn over data stored in our overseas data centers. (The citation for the case is In the



Matter of a Warrant to Search Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, Case No. 14-2985, 829 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 2016)).

Blocking demands

On occasion, we are required by government orders, regulations or other legal requirements to block access to specified websites. To be clear, these are requests to block access to a website, not a request to remove user content; we did not receive a request from any government to remove user content last year. While we have not received blocking demands in the United States, we have received such demands in a handful of other countries. Generally, the blocking demands are issued because the websites are contrary to laws in those countries relating to child pornography, online gambling or copyright.

The figures below relate to the number of websites we were required to block access to during the relevant period of time. We may be required to block access in the specified country to such websites for an ongoing period of time but, except in Colombia, we count such demands only for the period in which they were initially made. For Colombia, because we are now provided with a running list of websites to block, we now report the total number of websites on the list at the end of the period. We were also required to block access to websites in India but are precluded by law from identifying the specific number of websites.

Country	1st Half of 2015	2nd Half of 2015	1st Half of 2016	2nd Half of 2016
Belgium	8	24	20	6
Columbia	1,460	1,428	2,243	2,270
Greece	26	0	150	342
Hungary	0	0	251	257
Italy	0	0	0	0
Portugal	74	28	0	0
Russian Federation	7	3	0	0