

An abstract network diagram featuring a central black node from which numerous colorful lines (blue, orange, green, yellow) radiate outwards, forming a complex web of connections. Some nodes are highlighted with colored dots (blue, orange, green) at various points along the lines.

DBIR

2021 Data Breach Investigations Report

SMB snapshot

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
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About the cover

There are eight pendulums on the cover. Each pendulum represents one of the new patterns in the DBIR. The weight of the pendulum represents how often the pattern occurs. The length of the pendulum is how often they are breaches, as opposed to simply incidents. Just like in security, it's difficult to predict where they'll be in the future.



Staying ready in a changing world

Changes in the real world often occur rapidly, and rarely give advanced notice of their arrival. Organizations are forced to react to these events quickly, and to make decisions regarding their security stance accordingly. The wisest decisions are informed decisions. While no one can accurately predict the threats they may have to face next month or next year, they can discern what eventualities are most probable and prepare for those. That is why we created the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR). This year's report is the 14th iteration and is powered by 83 contributing organizations—the highest number yet. The DBIR team analyzed 29,207 real-world security incidents, of which 5,258 were confirmed breaches, to create the 2021 DBIR.

This year, we have updated the DBIR patterns (now seven in number) using machine-learning clustering. This resulted in the creation of two completely new patterns—Social Engineering and System Intrusion—along with an overhaul of Basic Web Application Attacks and the recalibration of Denial of Service, Lost and Stolen Assets, Miscellaneous Errors, Privilege Misuse, plus Everything Else. We also provide a glimpse into how small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) compare and contrast with large enterprises with regard to threats.

Read on for report highlights related to SMBs, please pass this summary along to colleagues and download the full report at [verizon.com/dbir](https://www.verizon.com/dbir) for a more detailed view of the threat landscape in 2021.

29,207

The DBIR team analyzed **29,207 incidents, of which 5,258 were confirmed breaches.**

Getting better all the time

The DBIR team continues to work to expand and simplify the Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) framework to classify and analyze incidents and breaches. We have developed an updated mapping to the latest version of the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Controls®, which were released earlier this year. We provide the top recommended CIS Controls from Implementation Group 1 (IG1) in each industry section to provide additional guidance on how to most effectively mitigate the risks faced by each vertical. We also used the mappings to boost our analysis and have made them available for use by the larger security community as well.

Summary of findings




Figure 1. Patterns in breaches (n=5,275)

Figure 2. Patterns in incidents (n=29,206)




Figure 3. Select action varieties (n=4,073)




Figure 4. Select impacts of incidents

Key takeaways

Ransomware is still on the rise.

Ransomware appears in 10% of breaches—more than double the frequency from last year. This upward move was influenced by new tactics, where some ransomware now steals the data as they encrypt it. That puts Ransomware now in third place among actions causing breaches.

Vox populi... (might have said too much).

Eighty-five percent of breaches involved the human element. Phishing was present in 36% of breaches in our dataset, up from 25% last year. Business Email Compromises (BECs) were the second-most common form of Social Engineering. This reflects the rise of Misrepresentation, which was 15 times higher than last year.

Errors were (slightly) less of a problem.

Errors decreased last year as a percentage of breaches (from 22% to 17%), though they increased in absolute terms from 883 to 905 breaches. This breaks a three-year streak in Errors percentage either growing or remaining consistent.

Attackers still like your web apps.

Attacks on web applications continue to be high. They are the main attack vector in Hacking actions, with over 80% of breaches. In addition, Desktop sharing has moved into second place in Hacking vectors.

Mostly cloudy

Compromised external cloud assets were more common than on-premises assets in both incidents and breaches. Conversely, there was a decline of user devices (desktops and laptops) being compromised. This makes sense when we consider that breaches are moving toward Social and Web application vectors, such as gathering credentials and using them against cloud-based email systems.

What's the password?

Some things never seem to change: Breaches, as always, continue to be mostly due to external, financially motivated actors. And 61% of breaches involved credential data.

That was quite a year.

In August 2020, we speculated COVID-19 would lead to an increase in Phishing, Ransomware, Errors and Use of stolen credentials on web applications. In the 2021 DBIR, we found we were partially correct: Phishing increased by 11% and Ransomware increased by 6%. But the Use of stolen creds and publishing errors stayed consistent with last year (1% and -0.5% respectively), while Misconfiguration and Misdelivery decreased as a percentage of errors (-2% and -6% respectively).

Breaches have price tags.

This year, we attempted a deeper analysis of the impact of breaches on organizations. Using loss data, insurance cost data and stock price data, we have modeled the range of losses due to incidents.

The good news? Fourteen percent of simulated breaches had no impact. But don't count on that for your organization's security plan. The median for incidents with an impact was \$21,659, with 95% of incidents falling between \$826 and \$653,587.

Business Email Compromises (BECs) were the second-most common form of Social Engineering. This reflects the rise of Misrepresentation, which was 15 times higher than last year.

61%

Sixty-one percent of breaches involved credential data.

Incident Classification Patterns

The DBIR first introduced the Incident Classification Patterns in 2014 as a useful shorthand for scenarios that occurred very frequently. The threat landscape has changed a bit since then, so this year we are excited to introduce a refresh of the DBIR patterns.

The new patterns are based on an elegant machine-learning clustering process. These new patterns better capture complex interaction rules the old ones were unlikely to handle, and they are much more focused on what happens during the breach. That makes them better suited for control recommendations, too.

The updated patterns explain 95.8% of analyzed breaches and 99.7% of analyzed incidents over all time.

Here are our key findings from each pattern.

Social Engineering

Psychological compromise of a person that alters their behavior into taking an action or breaching confidentiality

Social attacks as a pattern have continued to increase since 2017, with BEC breaches doubling again since last year. Web-based email is a favorite target.

- Over 80% of breaches are discovered by external parties
- Phishing templates have a wide range of click rates, from no clicks to click rates over 50%
- In a sample of 1,148 people who received real and simulated phishes, none of them clicked the simulated phish, but 2.5% clicked the real phishing email

Basic Web Application Attacks

Simple web application attacks with a small number of steps or additional actions after the initial web application compromise

We redesigned the Basic Web Application Attacks pattern to capture what had been hiding in web application-focused errors, social engineering and system intrusions. The attacks were largely against cloud-based servers that were hacked via the Use of stolen credentials or brute-force attacks.

- Ninety-five percent of organizations suffering credential-stuffing attacks had between 637 and 3.3 billion malicious login attempts through the year
- The Information industry overtook the Finance industry as the most common target of botnet attacks on customers this year

System Intrusion	System Intrusion captures the complex attacks that leverage Malware and/or Hacking to achieve their objectives, including deploying ransomware.	<p>The creation of this new pattern and its placement (tied at the #3 spot in breaches with Miscellaneous Error and behind Social Engineering and Basic Web Application Attacks) provides clarity to organizations trying to understand how much to invest in preventing advanced threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Over 70% of cases in this pattern involved malware and 40% involved hacking actions • Ninety-nine percent of ransomware cases fell into this pattern
Miscellaneous Errors	Incidents where unintentional actions directly compromised a security attribute of an information asset. This does not include lost devices, which is grouped with theft instead.	<p>Miscellaneous Errors decreased as a percentage of breaches. This was not due to a decrease in errors, however, but because of an increase in other types of breaches.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Misconfiguration was by far the most common form of error (approximately 52%) • The vast majority of the time, when known, security researchers (80%) were responsible for discovery • Personal data was the most commonly exposed data type in this pattern
Privilege Misuse	Incidents predominantly driven by unapproved or malicious use of legitimate privileges	<p>Privilege Misuse continues to decrease as a percentage of breaches, thus underscoring the lower incidence of malicious insider threats compared to other patterns.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seventy percent of breaches in this pattern were due to privilege abuse • Over 30% of incidents take months or years to discover
Lost and Stolen Assets	Any incident where an information asset went missing, whether through misplacement or malice	<p>Error (in the form of loss of an asset) is more common than theft of assets, and employees discovering issues is the most common way incidents come to light. Increasingly, people lose devices rather than documents or other media.</p>
Denial of Service	Attacks intended to compromise the availability of networks and systems. Includes both network and application layer attacks.	<p>Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are highly unevenly distributed (spiky), making them difficult to predict. Instead, this requires organizations to plan for the percentage of DDoS attacks they want to be able to handle (50%, 80%, 95% or more).</p>
Everything Else	This last pattern isn't really a pattern at all. Instead, it covers all incidents that don't fit within the orderly confines of the other patterns.	<p>The former Payment Card Skimmer pattern ended up here. There were only 20 skimming incidents (all confirmed breaches) in the dataset this year.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This year, three of the rarely seen Environmental-caused breaches were added and are included in this pattern given their relative rarity • The reclustering of the patterns allowed us to explain an additional 18% of breaches that would have otherwise fallen into this pattern

Diving back into SMB breaches

One size fits all-most

The first thing we noticed while analyzing the data by organizational size (SMBs vs. enterprises) this year was that the gap between the two with regard to the number of breaches has become much less pronounced. Last year, SMBs accounted for less than half the number of breaches that large enterprises showed. Unlike most political parties, this year these two are less far apart with 307 breaches in large and 263 breaches in small organizations.

Another interesting finding was that the top patterns have aligned across both org sizes. For the first time since we began to look at this from an organizational size perspective, the two groups are very similar to each other and, at least pattern-wise, this seems like a "one size fits all" situation.

Last year, SMBs were greatly troubled by Web Applications, Everything Else and Miscellaneous Errors. The changes in our patterns account for a good bit of what we see this year in small organizations, since the Everything Else pattern was recalibrated, and the attacks that remain are largely Hacking and Malware, thus fitting into the System Intrusion pattern. In contrast, large organizations saw a fair amount of actual change. The top three last year were Everything Else, Crimeware and Privilege Misuse. The pattern recalibration means that most of the Crimeware type events went into System Intrusion and Basic Web Application Attacks, but Privilege Misuse is not a pattern that saw any substantial degree of change. Therefore, this is an indication that we saw fewer Internal actors doing naughty things with their employer's data.

	Small (fewer than 1,000 employees)	Large (more than 1,000 employees)
Frequency	1,037 incidents, 263 with confirmed data disclosure	819 incidents, 307 with confirmed data disclosure
Top Patterns	System Intrusion, Miscellaneous Errors and Basic Web Application Attacks represent 80% of breaches	System Intrusion, Miscellaneous Errors and Basic Web Application Attacks represent 74% of breaches
Threat Actors	External (57%), Internal (44%), Multiple (1%), Partner (0%) (breaches)	External (64%), Internal (36%), Partner (1%), Multiple (1%) (breaches)
Actor Motives	Financial (93%), Espionage (3%), Fun (2%), Convenience (1%), Grudge (1%), Other (1%) (breaches)	Financial (87%), Fun (7%), Espionage (5%), Convenience (2%), Grudge (2%), Secondary (1%) (breaches)
Data Compromised	Credentials (44%), Personal (39%), Other (34%), Medical (17%) (breaches)	Credentials (42%), Personal (38%), Other (34%), Internal (17%) (breaches)

Since the patterns have now largely aligned between the two organizational sizes, we can talk a little about what that means for both. First, both are being targeted by financially motivated organized-crime actors. This isn't a news flash to anyone (or shouldn't be) because professional criminals do tend to be motivated by money. For that matter, we'd wager most amateur criminals are as well (if we were the wagering type, which, of course, we aren't. As far as you know).

Concerning the common patterns of System Intrusion and Basic Web Application Attacks, those run the gamut from simple to complex attacks, frequently focused on web infrastructure. The Hacking action of Use of stolen creds followed by Malware installation is the playbook these actors prefer to follow. Increasingly, we see ransomware deployed by the actor after access, sometimes after they have taken a copy of the data to incentivize their victims to part with their hard-earned bitcoin.

When we turn to Discovery timelines, we see a difference between the organizational sizes (Figures 5 and 6 respectively). Last year, we reported that SMBs seemed to be doing better in terms of discovering breaches more quickly than their larger counterparts.

This year's data shows that large enterprises have made a shift to finding breaches within "days or less" in over half of the cases (55%), while SMBs fared less positively at 47%.

Last year, we reported that SMBs seemed to be doing better in terms of discovering breaches more quickly than their larger counterparts.




Figure 5. Discovery timeline in Small and Medium Business breaches (n=83)

Figure 6. Discovery timeline in Large Business breaches (n=92)

Best practices

This year, we combined the newly updated CIS Controls with our own newly updated patterns to identify the core set of Controls that every organization should consider implementing regardless of size and budget.

Control 4: Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software

This Control is not only a mouthful, but it also contains many subcontrols focused on engineering solutions that are secure from the outset rather than tacking security on later. Implementing this Control will help to reduce Error-based breaches such as Misconfiguration and Loss of assets through enforcing remote-wipe abilities on portable devices.

Control 5: Account Management

While this is technically a new version 8 Control, it should be extremely familiar as the subcontrols are simply a centralization of the previous account management practices that were found in a few of the previous Controls (e.g., Boundary Protect and Account Monitoring and Control). This control is very much targeted at helping organizations manage access to accounts and is useful against brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks.

Control 6: Access Control

This Control is directly related to Control 5. Rather than simply looking at user accounts and managing access to those, you are also managing the rights and privileges. It calls for enforcing multifactor authentication on key components of the environment, which is a useful tactic against the Use of stolen credentials.

Control 14: Security Awareness and Skills Training

This control is a classic and hopefully doesn't need a great deal of explanation. Considering the high prevalence of Errors and Social Engineering, it is obvious that awareness and technical training is a smart place to invest some money to help support your team against a world full of cognitive hazards.

Stay informed and threat ready.

Successfully navigating through the cyberthreats facing SMBs today requires intelligence from a source you can trust. The full DBIR contains real-world details on the actors, actions and patterns that can help you to prepare your defenses and educate your organization.

Read the full 2021 DBIR at [verizon.com/dbir](https://www.verizon.com/dbir)

Want to make the world a better place?

The DBIR relies on contributions from dozens of organizations, and we'd love to have you. Become a contributor to next year's report or provide us with feedback for improving the DBIR at dbir@verizon.com, tweet us [@VZDBIR](https://twitter.com/VZDBIR) and check out the VERIS GitHub page: <https://github.com/vz-risk/veris>

